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SITUATIONAL DESCRIPTIONS OF BEHAVIORAL
PROCEDURES: THE IN SITU TESTBED
STEVEN M. KEMP AND DAVID A. ECKERMAN
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL
We demonstrate the In Situ testbed, a system that aids in evaluating computational models of learn-
ing, including artificial neural networks. The testbed models contingencies of reinforcement using
an extension of Mechner’s (1959) notational system for the description of behavioral procedures.
These contingencies are input to the model under test. The model’s output is displayed as cumulative
records. The cumulative record can then be compared to one produced by a pigeon exposed to the
same contingencies. The testbed is tried with three published models of learning. Each model is
exposed to up to three reinforcement schedules (testing ends when the model does not produce
acceptable cumulative records): continuous reinforcement and extinction, fixed ratio, and fixed
interval. The In Situ testbed appears to be a reliable and valid testing procedure for comparing
models of learning.
Key words: neural networks, reinforcement schedules, situated action, learning theory, key peck,
computer simulation, POMDP
The purpose of the present paper is to in-
troduce a new technique, called an In Situ
simulation, for evaluating and testing com-
putational models of learning, including the
recently developed neural networks (e.g., see
Donahoe, Palmer, & Burgos, 1997). The test-
ing is carried out by (a) exposing the learn-
ing model to schedules of reinforcement and
(b) generating cumulative records of the
learning model’s output. These records may
be compared to those a pigeon generates fol-
lowing comparable exposure. We hope that
In Situ simulations will provide a standard-
ized approach to testing learning models that
seek to characterize operant learning to allow
comparison across models. We consider that
the In Situ testbed has a function much like
a wind tunnel used in testing models of air-
plane design. The testbed provides the wind
patterns, and the model shows how it flies in
these wind patterns. In our case we are seek-
ing to know if the model ‘‘flies’’ in a manner
that is similar to a pigeon.1
We thank Adam N. Rosenberg for his invaluable assis-
tance with both mathematical and conceptual issues and
J. E. R. Staddon, Ido Erev, and Gene Steinhauer for their
assistance with the various models tested. We also thank
the four anonymous reviewers for their guidance.
For additional information, reprints, and copies of ma-
terials, please contact Steven M. Kemp, Psychology De-
partment, Davie Hall, CB 3270, University of North Car-
olina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599-3270 (E-mail:
stevepkemp@unc.edu).
1 We are currently implementing a version of the In
Situ testbed for use in evaluating state-of-the-art models
of learning. To make use of this resource, readers are
Quantitative approaches in psychology
might be divided into two types. In one ap-
proach, quantitative methods are used to pro-
duce a general expression of a functional re-
lation between behavior and the environment.
The matching law (Baum, Schwendiman, &
Bell, 1999; Herrnstein, 1997) is such a for-
mulation. Each functional relation captures
some aspect of a behavioral phenomenon ex-
pressed at its own level of analysis and is usu-
ally tied to a class of experimental procedures
that demonstrate that phenomenon. Using
the second approach, a quantitative system is
constructed that accepts input from an envi-
ronment and produces output that may be
functionally related to this input. The proce-
dure that generates the output is intended to
capture the effects of the environment and
the neural processes that produce real behav-
ior. The level of analysis must correspond to
the level of detail of the description of the
behavioral procedure. The more effects cap-
tured, the more successfully control by the
procedure is predicted. When the system
invited to send to the first author an executable program
module for DOS or Windows (Windows NT compatible)
that accepts input and provides output as described be-
low. Cumulative records will be returned to the sender
to begin an evaluation of his or her model. These cu-
mulative records may be compared to records produced
by a pigeon in procedures similar to our tests. Although
the current implementation requires collaboration with
the authors, a future stand-alone implementation is
planned. This stand-alone implementation will be suffi-
ciently user-friendly (and documented) for readers to
evaluate their own models.
136 STEVEN M. KEMP and DAVID A. ECKERMAN
changes its output on the basis of a prior his-
tory of inputs, this may be called a learning
model.
Skinner (1950) raised cautions regarding
the use of learning models in his well-known
essay titled ‘‘Are Theories of Learning Nec-
essary?’’ He worried, for example, that inter-
est in developing models might distract re-
searchers from carrying out a careful
experimental analysis of the behavior of real
organisms. Although we agree with Skinner’s
priority of ‘‘experimental analysis first,’’ we
propose that the time is here to use a mod-
eling approach to bridge the gap between the
extensive experimental analysis that has ac-
cumulated under Skinner’s banner and the
growing database of new neurophysiological
data. The availability of these two databases
makes possible the kind of model testing we
espouse in this report.
Specifically, Skinner (1984a, 1988a) said
the following about mathematical models:
No matter how many of the formulations de-
rived from a study of a model eventually prove
useful in describing reality . . ., the questions
to which answers are most urgently needed
concern the correspondence between the two realms
[italics added]. How can we be sure that a
model is a model of behavior? What is behavior,
and how is it to be analyzed and measured? What
are the relevant features of the environment, and
how are they to be measured and controlled? [italics
added] How are these two sets of variables re-
lated? The answers to these questions cannot
be found by constructing models. (p. 514, p.
83)
We propose that the In Situ approach ad-
vocated in this report speaks directly to Skin-
ner’s concerns. It offers a formal and system-
atic method for relating models to behavior
by establishing a standard set of logical rela-
tions between the environmental and behav-
ioral variables. To the degree that our situa-
tional view of how relevant features of the
environment exert their control over behav-
ior is correct and general, the models tested
here will be compelled to demonstrate that
they are models of behavior by coming under
control of the simulated environmental con-
tingencies in the same way that real behavior
comes under the control of real contingen-
cies. Further, with the relations between en-
vironmental and behavioral variables fixed,
each model tested is challenged to demon-
strate that it is competitive with other models
by coming under the control of the same en-
vironmental variables simulated in the same
way. We offer this report realizing that our
specific implementation of the relation be-
tween environment and behavior is incom-
plete. We believe, however, that we demon-
strate what can be gained if the assumptions
of situativity theory (Barwise & Perry, 1983;
Clancey, 1993) are applied to describing how
environmental and behavioral variables are
related.
When Skinner (1950) presented his con-
cern with models of learning, the coffers of
neuroscience were nearly empty and theorists
were free to fill their ‘‘conceptual nervous sys-
tem’’ with anything needed by their theory.
In the decades since 1950, however, neuro-
biological knowledge has increased consid-
erably. We join Donahoe and Palmer in ad-
vocating that we include this knowledge into
our thinking. We also join these authors in
encouraging the use of ‘‘formal interpreta-
tion’’ (Donahoe & Palmer, 1994, pp. 128–
129; Shull, 1995, pp. 350–353). Skinner
(1984b, 1988b) provided a specific recom-
mendation regarding the needs of behavior
analysis for the data of neuroscience:
A behavioral analysis has two necessary but un-
fortunate gaps—the spatial gap between be-
havior and the variables of which it is a
function and the temporal gap between the
actions performed upon an organism and the
often deferred changes in its behavior. These
gaps can be filled only by neuroscience, and
the sooner they are filled, the better. (p. 722,
p. 470)
We propose that the In Situ approach advo-
cated in this report will help in filling these
gaps.
Although complex computational models
of learning, especially neural networks, are
growing in popularity (see references for the
models we test below), there are many issues
that make their evaluation difficult. One is
that the specific predictions made by a model
for various conditioning procedures are dif-
ficult to determine even when the equations
are published. Whereas the predictions of
older quantitative models often could be cal-
culated directly with paper, calculator, and
pencil, these newer, dynamic models produce
predictions that are highly dependent on the
particular sequence of events involved. Our
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In Situ approach provides a means of gener-
ating these predictions in a standard, repeat-
able, and documentable manner, more or
less independent of the model chosen.
Another difficulty is that published predic-
tions for learning models are often expressed
in terms of behavioral measures that are con-
venient for the modeler and specific to the
problem or phenomenon the modeler is ad-
dressing. These predictions may be difficult
for the reader to evaluate as part of a general
comparison of models. In fact, because each
model is presented with different procedures
and different measures, the comparison of
competing models is especially difficult. Our
In Situ approach allows a wide variety of
learning models to be swapped in and out
and uses a standard set of testing procedures
with each, thus facilitating model compari-
son.
In developing our In Situ testbed, we are
following our own advice (Kemp & Ecker-
man, 1995) as well as that of Church (1997).
We are aware of no published simulations of
any computational model of learning that im-
plement more than a small number of the
features recommended by these authors for
making direct comparisons of different learn-
ing models. We offer such comparisons be-
low.
The In Situ approach conforms to all of
Kemp and Eckerman’s (1995) and Church’s
(1997) recommendations listed here:
1. Separate models from the behavioral
procedures. We recommend building learn-
ing models and behavioral procedures into
separate software modules and setting stan-
dards for data passed from the test procedure
to the model (the stimuli) and data passed
from model to procedure (the responses).
This allows a set of multiple procedures to be
used to test any model and multiple models
to be tested with each procedure. Testing can
be accomplished simply by swapping modules
in the simulator.
2. Record model outputs in a form that is
comparable to records of real behavior. If
output record formats are standardized to
match those from experiments using real or-
ganisms, this allows an improved comparison
between the behavior of the synthetic and the
real organisms. Church (1997) specifically
recommends a ‘‘Time.Event’’ format record-
ing ‘‘the sequence of times of occurrence of
stimuli and responses’’ (p. 387). This ap-
proach also allows a variety of different be-
havioral measures to be summarized identi-
cally from both the real organism and the
model (e.g., ratios of responses, etc.). This is
the approach Kemp and Eckerman (1995)
called a ‘‘direct analysis.’’
3. Use a standard set of multiple graded
procedures to evaluate each model. Church
(1997) advocates the use of multiple behav-
ioral procedures to evaluate any single mod-
el. Here, we go further by recommending
that each model be subjected to a standard
sequence of procedures, graded from easy to
hard. In the present study, we use a sequence
of single-key operant procedures: continuous
reinforcement (CRF), continuous reinforce-
ment followed by extinction (CRF/EXT),
fixed-ratio (FR) reinforcement, and fixed-in-
terval (FI) reinforcement. Using a standard
sequence facilitates crossmodel comparison.
Using a graded sequence helps to pinpoint
functional shortcomings of the model. If a
model passes an easier test and fails a harder
one, that suggests that challenges added in
the harder test required behavioral capacities
beyond the scope of the model. Specific rea-
sons for choosing different reinforcement
schedules to comprise this series are noted in
the discussion at the end of this report.
4. Situate responses and stimuli spatially as
well as temporally. Kemp and Eckerman
(1995) advocated that descriptions of learn-
ing models and behavioral procedures rep-
resent the organism and its environment as
located in both space and time. Recently, si-
tuativity theory (Clancey, 1993, 1997; D. A.
Norman, 1993; Suchman, 1993; Vera & Si-
mon, 1993a) has emphasized the many im-
portant implications that follow from this
proposal. With respect to stimuli, for exam-
ple, what a pigeon sees (i.e., is visually con-
trolled by) depends critically on where it is
looking. The display available to an organism
at a particular place and time is called a sit-
uated stimulus. The timers and counters of the
reinforcement contingency are not available
to the pigeon and are not included in the
situated stimulus. Below we will connect this
characteristic with an approach to describing
environmental contingencies named partially
observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs).
Analysis in terms of operants, describing re-
sponses in terms of their effects, demands
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that movements made by an organism (e.g.,
a head thrust) also must be situated. The clo-
sure of the key switch, for example, can only
be accurately simulated by taking into ac-
count both the behavior and the location of
the organism at the time of emission.
The issue of situativity is relevant to the
gaps noted by Skinner. A neuroscientific the-
ory cannot simply be plugged into an envi-
ronment and treated as a model of behavior.
Although a neural network or other biobe-
havioral model may make a simulated body
move (just as real neural activity makes a real
body move), these bodily movements in turn
must be situated to bring about changes in
the environment (e.g., a bar press, a key
peck). Typically, behavioral accounts are giv-
en in terms of environmental circumstances
and behavioral accomplishments (functional
terms). Neuroscientific accounts, however,
are given in terms of classes of neural events
and bodily movements (formal or topograph-
ic terms). A translation must be made be-
tween bodily movements and the accomplish-
ments they bring about (i.e., operants). This
dilemma, which we call the neural network di-
lemma, was examined in detail by Weiss (1924,
pp. 42–44, 1925, pp. 55–56; see also Guthrie,
1940, and Lee, 1983, 1986, 1996). The In Situ
approach provides a means of solving this di-
lemma, thereby permitting the integration of
behavioral and neuroscientific data.
5. When comparing models, first compare
their output for each procedure to that of a
real organism and then compare their rela-
tive successes (in matching real behavior) to
determine the best fit. Testing learning mod-
els using the In Situ testbed facilitates model
comparison, but it does make things tougher
on the individual models. Traditionally, au-
thors of computational models have used
tests that show their models to best advantage
by selecting and designing procedures appro-
priately. The model is often developed to
make concrete a general point being raised
by the author. To emphasize this point, the
model is tested in a restricted and specific
way.2 The successful initial simulation merits
publication and introduces the model to the
2 Noteworthy exceptions include Daly and Daly (1982)
and Schmajuk, Lamoureux, and Holland (1998), in
which an attempt is made to test the model using a com-
prehensive sample of behavioral procedures, albeit using
nonsituational representations of those procedures.
scientific community. If the new model is to
have a broad impact on the field, however, it
must be tested in a manner that permits com-
parisons with other models. Our use of fixed
standardized sets of procedures makes this
possible. Because our tests are more demand-
ing, the models tested here will fare rather
less well than in their previous publications.
The present study is designed to demon-
strate the reliability and validity of the In Situ
testbed. To accomplish this goal, three pub-
lished models of learning (Daly & Daly, 1982;
Roth & Erev, 1995; Staddon & Zhang, 1991)
were compared under four reinforcement
conditions (tasks): operant level, CRF fol-
lowed by EXT (both in Simulation 1), FR re-
inforcement (in Simulation 2), and FI rein-
forcement (in Simulation 3). These tasks
were chosen independently of the strengths
or weaknesses of any particular model. In-
stead, the tasks were chosen as those produc-
ing (in real animals) the kind of results a
broadly applicable learning model should as-
pire to predict. In a sense, the tasks are stan-
dardized tests for learning theories.
Despite these restrictions, model parame-
ters were freely adjusted to produce the best
possible performance by each learning mod-
el. Because the testing procedures were stan-
dardized, the adjustments to each model to
optimize results did not produce unfair ad-
vantage over other models. We acknowledge
that establishing standards is a risky business
because it can close off divergent paths. We
invite the reader to consider the In Situ test-
bed as a starting place for the development
of appropriate standards.
Mechner’s Diagrams As a Base for
Our Work
A brief tutorial on Mechner’s system for de-
scribing reinforcement schedules is provided,
because this system is the starting point for
the diagrams we use for specifying the simu-
lated environmental contingencies within the
In Situ testbed. Mechner diagrams (Mechner,
1959; Millenson, 1967; Weingarten & Mech-
ner, 1966) facilitate model comparison by
standardizing the precise specification of pro-
cedures in a publicly accessible format. Fig-
ure 1 shows Mechner diagrams for CRF, FR
reinforcement, and FI reinforcement sched-
ules. Each square bracket indicates a distinct
state in the contingency. The stimulus symbol
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Fig. 1. Mechner diagrams for (a) CRF, (b) FR rein-
forcement, and (c) FI reinforcement schedules. Each
square bracket indicates a distinct situation. The stimulus
symbol (S) at the top of each bracket indicates the entire
prevailing stimulus complex for that situation. SD indi-
cates the presentation of the discriminative stimulus. SR
indicates the presentation of the reinforcing stimulus.
Each arrow indicates a change in situation. The symbol
at the tail of each arrow (R for responses, T for time
elapsed) indicates the event that precipitates the change.
R1 indicates the operant response. RC indicates the con-
summatory response. n indicates that the following re-
sponse must be emitted multiple times. T indicates that
a period of time must pass.
at the top of the bracket indicates the pre-
vailing stimulus complex for that state. The
term SD indicates presentation of the discrim-
inative stimulus; SR indicates presentation of
the reinforcing stimulus. Each arrow indi-
cates a change in state: The symbol at the tail
of the arrow indicates the event that precip-
itated the change. R1 indicates the operant
response; RC indicates the consummatory re-
sponse. Thus for CRF (a), a single operant
response in the presence of SD produces the
reinforcing stimulus and allows the consum-
matory response to return the procedure to
the initial state. FR reinforcement (b) is sim-
ilar except that the term n indicates that the
operant response must be emitted n times to
shift state. When FI reinforcement (c) is ar-
ranged, T seconds must elapse in the pres-
ence of the SD before the state changes to
one in which an operant response produces
the reinforcing stimulus.
The In Situ testbed expands Mechner’s
(1959) system as we describe below. We also
integrate principles of situational semantics
(Barwise, 1989; Barwise & Perry, 1983). This
extension establishes a connection between
reinforcement schedules and a formal class of
mathematical entities called POMDPs3 ( Jaak-
ola, Singh, & Jordan, 1995; Kaelbling, Litt-
man, & Cassandra, 1998; Monahan, 1982;
Singh, Jaakola, & Jordan, 1994; Sondik,
1971). Use of POMDPs further facilitates
crosslaboratory replicability as well as the im-
plementation of certain situational features
(see below). Also, the use of POMDPs places
In Situ simulations firmly within the frame-
work of the computational learning approach
developed by Sutton and Barto (1998) that is






To demonstrate the capabilities of the In
Situ testbed, three models were selected to
serve as subjects of the simulations. The cri-
teria for inclusion were that (a) the model is
claimed to account for operant behavior, (b)
claims for the model are confirmed by the
results of published simulations, and (c) the
model was published in enough detail to al-
low reprogramming into the testbed. In ad-
dition, the models differ substantially from
one another in the mathematical techniques
employed in the calculations.
Each of the three models is summarized
below. Each original model had to be aug-
mented to implement it within the In Situ
testbed. For purposes of clarity, we will des-
ignate each original unnamed model using
3 The well-known limitations of Markov models as mod-
els of learning (Kintsch, 1970) are not of special concern
here. Our claim is that POMDPs are very general repre-
sentations of behavioral procedures, not of learning.
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the last names of its authors and designate
our implementation using their initials.
When the original model was named by its
authors, we will add an asterisk to designate
our implementation. Although presentation
of the details for these models is not neces-
sary to our present purpose, we have includ-
ed a full description of our implementations
in Appendixes A, B, and C for purposes of
documentation and replication.
SZ model. Staddon and Zhang (1991) offer
a simple stochastic model of reinforcement
effects, selecting the behavior (of m potential
behaviors) with the highest calculated value
(V) on each cycle, the winner-take-all meth-
od. We call our implementation of that mod-
el the SZ model. The model has two param-
eters, a and b. The a parameter (adaptation
or conditionability) determines the length of
time the effect of reinforcement persists. The
b parameter (arousal or elicitability) deter-
mines the magnitude of the effect of rein-
forcement. Each behavior’s V value on each
cycle is a stochastic function of a and b and
V(t 2 1), its value on the previous cycle. Sto-
chasticity insures that the maximum V varies
from step to step.
The equations for the SZ model imple-
mented in the present tests specified two de-
tails that were left indefinite in the published
article. The original theory included no ex-
plicit model of antecedent stimuli. In our
equations, a separate V value was created for
every possible stimulus–response pair. Fur-
ther, initial V values were set to .5 instead of
1, because this provided better initial stability.
Appendix A provides the detailed equations
used in the simulations of the SZ model.
RE model. Roth and Erev (1995) offer a sim-
ple account of selection by reinforcement
that also calculates a V value (always nonneg-
ative) for each behavior on each iteration.
Here, the likelihood of a behavior being
emitted on a given iteration is proportional
to the ratio of its V value to the sum of all the
V values (Luce, 1959). The V value of the be-
havior emitted just prior to reinforcement is
augmented by 1. Roth and Erev tested their
algorithm in trial-by-trial simulations, but no
specific guidance was provided for generating
a moment-to-moment account. Our imple-
mentation, called the RE model, thus adds an
exponential decay function to the original
model to account for the effects of delay of
reinforcement. As with the SZ model, a V val-
ue was created for every possible stimulus–
response pair rather than just for each re-
sponse. The reinforcer altered all V values,
but the likelihood of emitting a response was
calculated only with respect to the V values
for the immediately present stimulus.
There are two parameters: reinforcer potency
and decay rate of the effects of the reinforcer
over time since the response. The net effect
of reinforcer potency was halved after each
second, following Staddon and Zhang
(1991). Reinforcer potency was set to 1.0 (ar-
bitrarily, because only one type of reinforcer
is utilized). Appendix B provides the detailed
equations used in the simulations of the RE
model.
DMOD* model. Daly and Daly (1982, 1984)
modified Rescorla and Wagner’s (1972) mod-
el of classical conditioning, such that it could
be used to model instrumental conditioning.
They labeled their model DMOD. We label
our implementation the DMOD* model.
The original model assigns a V value for
each stimulus–response pair, which is recal-
culated at each iteration. Each V value is the
sum of three components: approach, avoid-
ance, and counterconditioning. (a) The ap-
proach component is calculated according to
the Rescorla–Wagner (1972) theory. The ap-
proach value varies between two asymptotes,
0 and l (Bush & Mosteller, 1951, 1955; Na-
rendra & Thathachar, 1989). The value in-
creases when the reinforcer is delivered and
decreases when the reinforcer is not present-
ed. (b) The avoidance component is a nega-
tive number that ranges from 0 down to twice
the arithmetic inverse of the approach value.
It is included to represent a diminished influ-
ence of the reinforcer when a difference ex-
ists between expected and actual reinforcer
amount. (c) The counterconditioning com-
ponent moderates the avoidance value. It is
positive and ranges between 0 and the arith-
metic inverse of the avoidance component,
rising as reinforcer amount increases and fall-
ing as reinforcer amount decreases.
As with the Rescorla–Wagner model,
DMOD and DMOD* contain two types of pa-
rameters, a and b. a indicates the salience of
each of the discriminative cues. b indicates
distinct learning rates for the different com-
ponents of V. Each of the three compo-
nents—approach, avoidance, and counter-
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conditioning—has two bs, one for increasing
V and one for decreasing V, for a total of six
bs in all. In addition, there are bs for second-
ary reinforcement that can be set separately
from those for primary reinforcement, mak-
ing for 12 b parameters in all. (Usually, most
of the b parameters are set equal to one an-
other, making for only two to four parame-
ters.)
There are important differences between
DMOD and the Rescorla–Wagner model as
well as between DMOD and DMOD*. The
Rescorla–Wagner model can be interpreted
as predicting changes in associative strength
between stimuli due to the presentation of
what has been labeled by some as a reinforc-
er, the unconditioned stimulus (Mackintosh,
1983, pp. 189–192). On this reading, the oc-
currence of the conditioned response is an
index of the degree of associative strength of
the conditioned stimulus (Mackintosh, pp.
19–22). In like fashion, Daly and Daly (1982)
used instrumental responding as an index of
associative strength of discriminative stimuli
due to the subsequent presentation of a re-
inforcer. In addition, secondary reinforce-
ment is modeled by having each discrimina-
tive stimulus acquire reinforcing properties
proportionate to the V values conditioned to
it (Sutton & Barto, 1998).
This approach leaves open two questions
regarding concurrent responses. Given the
associative strengths at a particular moment
in time, what determines which of the avail-
able responses is emitted? Given that a par-
ticular response is emitted, which associative
strength should be altered due to reinforce-
ment? Daly and Daly (1982, pp. 465–466) ex-
plicitly avoid the first issue in their discussion
of choice, but their discussion indicates how
they handle the second issue. In essence, as-
sociative strengths for choice alternatives are
calculated separately and are then compared.
In their trial-by-trial simulations, Daly and
Daly reported the differences between asso-
ciative strengths as the dependent variable. In
implementing DMOD in moment-to-moment
simulations, Steinhauer (1986, chap. 7) fol-
lows this approach by constructing a separate
system of associative strengths for each alter-
native response. After a response is emitted,
V values associating that response (and only
that response) with the preceding stimuli are
altered due to any subsequent primary and
secondary reinforcers. As with the Rescorla–
Wagner model, all occurrent stimuli share an
asymptote. Any changes in associative
strength, however, apply only to the response
emitted.
Our DMOD* model follows this same ap-
proach. Whereas for the SZ and RE models,
a separate instantiation of the model was add-
ed for each stimulus, for DMOD* a separate
instantiation was added for each response.
DMOD* resolves the first issue in a manner
similar to the RE model. V values for all oc-
curring stimuli are summed for each re-
sponse. The probability of each response is
the total of the V values for that response,
divided by the sum of all the positive totals
(Luce, 1959). Negative totals are ignored.
Finally, the addition of multiple responses
to DMOD creates ambiguity in how to handle
secondary reinforcement. In DMOD, the re-
inforcing efficacy of a stimulus cue is deter-
mined relative to the V value for that cue. In
DMOD*, each cue has a separate V value for
each response. These V values must be com-
bined to calculate the overall reinforcing ef-
ficacy of the cue. DMOD* uses the V values
for each response to construct normalized
weights, which are then used to determine
each of the asymptotes for secondary rein-
forcement of the preceding cues. Appendix
C provides the detailed equations used in the
simulations of the DMOD* model.
Apparatus
Hardware and software. The current version
of the In Situ testbed is programmed in SAS/
IMLt (SAS Institute, 1996), and simulations
are performed on a Dell 450DE, a standard
Intelt 486-based desktop personal computer,
with the OS/2t Warp operating system.
Testbed design. Overall, the In Situ testbed
consists of three parts: (a) the testbed proper,
which simulates the functioning of the oper-
ant chamber and a minimal set of behavioral
topographies of the pigeon; (b) the learning
model under test, which interacts with the
testbed proper to generate behavioral proto-
cols; and (c) the graphics routine, which con-
verts the behavioral protocol into a cumula-
tive record.
The interaction between testbed and mod-
el derives from a general approach called dy-
namic programming (Bellman, 1957; J. M. Nor-
man, 1975). The testbed constitutes a Markov
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Fig. 2. Markov decision process of contingencies for
CRF. Each of the four pictograms illustrates the environ-
mental features of the corresponding state. The three
features are head position (up or down), keylight status
(on or off), and feeder status (open or closed). Above
each state is the stimulus symbol (i.e., observation) sent
to the learning model on each iteration. The four stim-
ulus symbols (SD, SD, S3, and S4) correspond to the four
sets of discriminable environmental features. Arrows in-
dicate state transitions due to simulated behavior. Each
arrow is labeled with the deed symbol (Peck, Up, and
Down) received from the learning model that produces
that state transition. The peck occurring in the state that
constitutes a key peck is labeled with an R for response.
Arrows corresponding to reinforcer delivery (e.g., feed-
ing) are labeled with the word ‘‘reinforce.’’ Whenever
the corresponding state transition occurs, a reinforcer
symbol is sent to the learning model.
decision process (MDP; cf. Howard, 1960),
and the learning model, an adaptive controller,
forms an interactive process with the MDP.
The MDP provides a computational model of
the environmental contingencies and the pi-
geon’s body. On each iteration (simulating ⅓
s of real time), the stimuli produced by the
simulated operant chamber are input to the
controller. The controller returns calcula-
tions stipulated by the learning theory being
tested, simulating the movements of the pi-
geon.
We use an expanded form of the Mechner
diagram to specify each MDP. Figure 2 illus-
trates how a standard Mechner diagram (Fig-
ure 1a) is expanded for a situational simula-
tion of CRF. This MDP consists of four states
(the four pictures) and three deeds (the arrow
labels). (Dynamic programming convention
designates these as actions, but we use the
term deeds to avoid confusion with behavioral
uses of action.) The states correspond to ex-
ternally observable states of the environment
and the pigeon’s body. Deeds correspond to
bodily movements. To be considered oper-
ants (e.g., key peck), the deed must occur in
the appropriate state (i.e., on the top left in
Figure 2).
Any of the three deeds can occur in any of
the four states, resulting in a total of 12 ar-
rows. However, for simplicity, arrows that con-
nect a state back to itself are not shown in
Figure 2 (e.g., Up deeds in the two upper
states).
At the beginning of each iteration cycle,
the label corresponding to the current state
(either SD, SD, S3, or S4) is output as an ob-
servation to the learning model being tested.
The learning model then returns the next
deed, and the testbed then determines the
state transition, if any, given that deed in that
state. The testbed also determines both re-
inforcer presentation (i.e., opening the feed-
er) and reinforcer delivery (i.e., feeding). Be-
cause many learning models require separate
input to indicate reinforcers (e.g., Sutton &
Barto, 1998), whenever the combination of
deed and state (e.g., peck at an open feeder)
indicates reinforcer delivery, the testbed out-
puts a ‘‘reinforcing signal’’ to the model. Fol-
lowing any state transition and reinforcer de-
livery, the next iteration cycle begins.
The MDP shown simplifies the model of
feeder operation in that a single peck at the
open feeder closes the feeder. In all the In
Situ simulations presented herein, the simu-
lated feeder actually was timed, opening for
a simulated 3⅔ s (11 iteration cycles). This
corresponds to Ferster and Skinner’s (1957,
p. 19) feeder interval of between 3.5 and 4 s.
During that period, any pecks at the feeder
resulted in reinforcer delivery. Discussion of
the modeling of timed events is deferred un-
til Simulation 3.
Stimuli for DMOD. DMOD (Daly & Daly,
1984) is specifically designed to accept stim-
ulus elements rather than stimulus complex-
es as input. To accommodate this property,
each of the four stimulus complexes was
translated into five separate elements (see Ta-
ble 1). This divergence from the general ap-
proach of the testbed simulations demon-
strates the kind of documentable flexibility
available.
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Table 1
Cue vectors for each stimulus and situation.
Situation Stimulus
Cues





























Note. Abbreviations for situation and stimulus values are explained in the legend for Figure 7.
Procedure
Reinforcement schedule. Within the testbed,
contingencies of reinforcement are specified
by the MDP. Figure 2 illustrates an MDP spec-
ifying CRF (neglecting the more usual timed
opening of the feeder as noted above). For
Simulations 2 and 3, we will abandon the pic-
tograms in favor of Mechner’s brackets. Be-
cause standard Mechner diagrams neglect to-
pographic details such as the raising and
lowering of the pigeon’s head, we consider
our diagrams (see Figures 7 and 10, present-
ed later) to be an expanded form of a Mech-
ner (1959) diagram.
Whatever type of diagram is used, the level
of detail must be fine-grained enough to de-
scribe all the processes used in the situational
simulation. The four states are specified in
terms of three situational variables describing
the status of the operant chamber (key lit or
off, feeder full or empty) and the location of
the pigeon’s head (top, bottom). The deed set
includes PECK (giving rise to a key peck
when the pigeon’s head is raised and feeding
when the pigeon’s head is lowered), ARCH
(raising the pigeon’s head), CURL (lowering
the pigeon’s head), and NULL. The NULL
deed is included to insure that the deed set
constitutes an exhaustive partition of all pos-
sible activities by the pigeon. By definition,
NULL deeds model any activity that never
changes the state, and the NULL arrows are
not shown.
Cumulative recorder. On each cycle in which
the feeder is closed, the paper roll of the cu-
mulative recorder advances. When the learn-
ing model outputs a peck and the pigeon’s
head is in front of the lit key, the pen on the
cumulative recorder moves up one unit. The




Operant level. Under extinction prior to any
conditioning, the SZ model showed bursts of
responding beginning after the first 1,000 cy-
cles. These bursts included from only a few
to over 200 responses, separated by periods
of no responding lasting from a few cycles to
a thousand (Figure 3a). (The reader will note
that the cumulative records are scaled differ-
ently from one figure to the next.) Overall,
the rate of responding was approximately 0.5
responses per second.
Acquisition. Slow, steady responding was ob-
served during CRF, with responding less than
one response per 10 s (Figure 3b). This
steady responding was very different from the
burst-and-pause pattern observed during the
operant level.
Extinction. Extinction began after about a
simulated 39 min (7,000 cycles) of CRF. A
rapid burst of about 50 key pecks emitted at
a rate of over 2 responses per second oc-
curred immediately. Responding then re-
sumed the burst-and-pause pattern previously
seen during the operant level. Overall rate
was maintained at approximately 0.5 respons-
es per second for the next 13,000 cycles.
Adjusting the operant level. Technical features
of the SZ model limit the degree to which the
likelihood of deeds can differ. With four V
values for the four deeds, no single deed
(e.g., PECK) can be emitted much less than
one fourth of the time, no matter how the
parameters change with conditioning. This
limitation of the SZ model appears to be a
major contributing factor to the unrealistical-
ly high operant level of key pecking noted
above. Multiple V values for each deed were
introduced to work around this limitation
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Fig. 3. Cumulative records of the SZ model under (a) EXT without prior reinforcement (operant level) and (b)
CRF followed by EXT. The top graph includes two separate labeled coordinates: a traditional rate box, showing slopes
for different rates of response, whose width and height indicate the scales of simulated time and responses, respec-
tively; and a conventional x-y coordinate axis, indicating iteration cycles and simulated responses, with the 0 point
denoting the start of the simulation. Vertical dotted lines indicate changes from one schedule contingency to the
next.
and lower the relative observed initial rate of
key pecking. Reducing this initial rate to as
low as one response in 10 min in an extended
session of a simulated 110 min (20,000 cycles)
of CRF did not produce conditioning (not
shown). Thus, within the present testbed, no
version of the SZ model was found that dem-
onstrates reinforcement of key pecking.
The Roth–Erev Model
Operant level. Under extinction, the RE
model produced a more or less steady rate of
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Fig. 4. Cumulative records of the RE model under (a) operant level (EXT) and (b) CRF. For CRF only, 30% of
NULL deeds were reinforced on a random-ratio schedule. Note the difference in scales between top and bottom
panels. See Figure 3 for an explanation of the scales and legend.
one peck per 5 s (Figure 4a). Over the length
of this period, the rate slows slightly but
steadily. The unrealistically high initial rate is
directly due to the parameter settings chosen.
These parameters were set so as to optimize
the match of the cumulative record for ac-
quisition and extinction to real animal be-
havior. Parameter settings that produced a
more realistic (lower) operant level produced
much less realistic acquisition and extinction.
Acquisition. When the initial likelihoods of
the four deeds (ARCH, CURL, PECK, and
NULL) were set equal, the RE model showed
rapid responding from the beginning of the
CRF period. Overall rate was approximately 1
response per second, and it did not increase
or decrease appreciably across training (not
shown).
To slow the rate of operant responding to
something more realistic, 30% of the NULL
deeds were randomly reinforced (a random-
ratio schedule), thereby strengthening com-
peting responses. Figure 4b shows that key
pecking increased across a simulated 3⅓ min
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(600 iteration cycles) of CRF with this ar-
rangement. Rate of responding increased
from about 0.25 responses per second to
about 0.7 responses per second. This increase
demonstrates a reinforcement effect. The val-
ue of 30% was empirically selected due to ex-
tinction effects (see below).
Extinction. Rate of responding stabilized at
about 1 response per second over a simulated
39 min (7,000 iteration cycles) of CRF with the
conditions described above (Figure 5a). Extinc-
tion was arranged at that point, and respond-
ing showed an immediate acceleration to al-
most 3 responses per second. This high, steady
rate was maintained over the next 15,000 cy-
cles, with only a slight drop in response rate.
Reinforcing NULL deeds at less than 30%
(not shown) lessened even this minimal drop
in response rate. Higher reinforcement rates
(also not shown) decreased response rates
during extinction slightly, but were deemed
unrealistic for reinforcement rates for com-
peting responses.
Across parameter settings, with differently
scheduled CRF and EXT components, the re-
sponse rate under extinction varied inversely
with the reinforcement rate for NULLs. Low-
er reinforcement rates for NULLs produced
unrealistic results. The highest reinforcement
rate deemed reasonable (30%) still failed to
extinguish responding.
Adjusting the operant level. In the simulations
presented thus far for the RE model, operant
level was unrealistically high due to initial V val-
ues for all four deeds being set equal. In a sub-
sequent simulation, initial V values were adjust-
ed to produce a realistic mix of the four deeds
(60 NULLs to each 4 ARCHs and 4 CURLs and
to each PECK). With this mix of initial values,
the RE model produced a low rate of key peck-
ing (less than 0.05 responses per second)
across the first simulated hour (11,000 cycles)
of CRF. At this time, there was a sudden tran-
sition to a remarkably stable (as determined by
visual inspection of the cumulative record)
high rate of key pecking (over 2 responses per
second) that persisted until the test was ended
at a simulated 100 min (Figure 5b). The pat-
tern of satiation typical of real pigeons (re-
duced responding after many reinforcers) was
not seen. Further, the rate of responding was
remarkably high compared to a typical pigeon
(which might emit a rate of approximately 0.5
responses per second).
The Daly–Daly Model
To simulate bodily movements comparable
to those of real naive pigeons in an operant
chamber, initial relative likelihoods of the
deeds were 360 NULLs to each 4 ARCHs and
4 CURLs and to each PECK. These initial set-
tings were used across all DMOD* simula-
tions.
Operant level. Figure 6a shows the DMOD*
model under extinction without prior rein-
forcement. A low rate of pecking (0.25 re-
sponses per second) for approximately a sim-
ulated 4 min (750 cycles) was followed by a
brief burst of rapid pecking (3 responses per
second) followed by a return to the lower rate
for a total of a simulated 18 min (3,300 cy-
cles) before pecking ceased entirely. Despite
the initial settings, the V values rapidly altered
to make all deeds equally likely. This appears
to be due to an increase in the avoidance
component and the fact that negative V val-
ues were treated as 0.
Acquisition. Under CRF, responding began
at 20 cycles and increased from less than 0.25
responses per second to around 1 response
per second in just over a simulated 1 min
(200 cycles). This rate of responding was
maintained throughout a simulated 11 min
(2,000 cycles).
Extinction. Following a simulated 6 min 40
s (1,200 iteration cycles) of CRF, responding
declined over the first 200 cycles under ex-
tinction and then recoverd and continued at
approximately 0.4 responses per second until
it abruptly ended at 5,000 cycles (see Figure
6b). This pattern provides a record that
might plausibly be obtained from a real pi-
geon.
To assess the stability of this pattern, the
procedure was repeated, but the shift to ex-
tinction was made 2 s earlier, at 1,184 cycles.
A different pattern of responding during ex-
tinction was obtained in this replication (see
Figure 6c). Responding was maintained fair-
ly steadily for over 18,000 cycles without an
apparent decline (about 0.4 responses per
second, slowly wavering between 0.3 and 0.5
responses per second). This pattern of re-
sponding appears to be unrealistic.
From a modeling perspective, obtaining two
such different patterns from such a slight
change in contingencies is disconfirming, be-
cause such slight alterations do not radically af-
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Fig. 5. Cumulative records of the RE model under (a) CRF followed by EXT and (b) CRF. The top panel (a)
shows results with initial likelihoods of different body movements set equal. The bottom panel (b) shows results with
more realistic initial likelihoods: few head bobs, fewer pecks, with all remaining behavior having unspecified topog-
raphies (NULL deeds). 30% of NULL deeds are reinforced on a random-ratio schedule. The response pen reset to
0 after each 3,000 responses. See Figure 3 for an explanation of the scales and legend.
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Fig. 6. Cumulative records of the DMOD* model under (a) operant level (EXT) and (b and c) CRF followed by
EXT. The shift to EXT (indicated by the vertical dotted line) occurred at 1,200 cycles in the middle panel (b) and
at 1,184 cycles in the bottom panel (c). See Figure 3 for an explanation of the scales and legend.
fect responding in the pigeon. From a mathe-
matical perspective, such hypersensitivity is
often found in simple nonlinear iterative sys-
tems. The dynamics of such systems are dis-
cussed under the rubrics complexity theory (Casti,
1997, chap. 3) and chaos theory (Gleick, 1987).
SIMULATION 2:
FIXED-RATIO SCHEDULES
Simulating FR schedules involves consid-
eration of a feature of MDPs called partial ob-
servability. The observable features in Figure
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Fig. 7. Expanded Mechner diagram for an FR schedule. Each bracket designates a state in the POMDP model of
the FR schedule. The stimulus symbol (observation) for each state (SD, SD, S3, or S4) is at the top of the bracket.
Observations are sent to the learning model on each iteration. Every deed (bodily movement) that results in a state
transition from a particular state is included within the bracket at the tail of an arrow pointing to the new state.
Deeds are received from the learning model. R indicates deeds that constitute responses. D indicates all other deeds.
Features distinguishing the states are identified within parentheses at the lower left of each bracket. Features are
head position, keylight and feeder status, and ratio counter setting. The arrow corresponding to reinforcer delivery
is labeled with a 1. Brackets sharing a stimulus symbol designate states that are not discriminable from the subject’s
perspective.
2 (head position, keylight and feeder status)
that distinguish the four states are also the
only features observable under other single-
key schedules, such as FR. Features unobserv-
able from the pigeon’s perspective, such as
the setting of the ratio counter, are relevant
to the contingencies of FR reinforcement and
must be modeled. When all of the features
determining the contingencies of reinforce-
ment are observable (as in CRF), the MDP is
called a completely observable Markov deci-
sion process, or COMDP. When some fea-
tures are unobservable, the MDP is referred
to as a partially observable Markov decision
process, or POMDP (Kaelbling et al., 1998).
A POMDP is diagrammed by having more
states than observation labels (see Figure 7).
For FR, all of the states with the pigeon’s
head raised and the keylight on are labeled
with observation SD, irrespective of the ratio
counter’s setting. S3 is the corresponding ob-
servation when the head is down. Observations
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correspond to states that are discriminable by
the pigeon being conditioned, which is to say,
Mechner’s (1959) stimulus complexes. In the
present simulations, the same four stimulus
complexes (SD, SD, S3, or S4) were used as
were used in Simulation 1. Figure 7 is a fully
realized expansion of Figure 1b, the standard
Mechner diagram for an FR schedule.
METHOD
Models and Apparatus
The SZ model was dropped from further
simulations due to its poor acquisition under
CRF. It was assumed that the SZ model would
not produce a decelerating reinforcement
rate under leaner schedules. The RE model
showed better performance under acquisi-
tion. Therefore, despite poor performance
under EXT, the RE model was retained. The
lack of reduced responding during extinc-
tion, however, indicates that the RE model
might be insensitive to differences between
CRF and FR or FI. DMOD* performed well
in Simulation 1, although it showed instabil-
ity. It was also retained for Simulation 2.
The apparatus was identical to that of Sim-
ulation 1.
Procedure
The procedure for In Situ simulation of FR
schedules is illustrated using an expanded
Mechner diagram (see Figure 7). The picto-
grams of Figure 2 have been replaced by
brackets, as in the standard Mechner diagram
(Mechner, 1959). The observation labels are
placed inside the brackets at the top (Millen-
son, 1967). In most other respects, this ex-
panded Mechner diagram works similarly to
the pictographic diagram: As before, arrows
for deeds that do not change the situation are
not shown but are still recorded as simulated
time on the cumulative record as long as the
feeder is closed. This expanded Mechner di-
agram also does not indicate that the feeder
was timed to open for 11 iteration cycles.
The strategy for testing the models under
FR was to retain the best parameters found
for each model under CRF/EXT and to sub-
ject each model first to CRF until stable re-
sponding (as determined by visual inspec-
tion) was established, followed by a sequence
of FR 2, FR 4, FR 8, FR 16, and FR 32.
RESULTS
The Roth–Erev Model
The data in Figure 8 show that the RE mod-
el achieved stable responding by a simulated
5.5 min (1,000 iteration cycles). Each of the
subsequent ratios was presented for that same
amount of time. As is standard with cumula-
tive records for schedules other than CRF,
whenever the feeder opened, a deflection of
the response pen (pip) was added to the cu-
mulative record in this and the subsequent
figures.
Performance under FR 1 was, of course,
identical to the performance previously
shown for CRF: steady responding at about 1
response per second. With the shift to FR 2,
response rates increased from 1 response per
second to 2.5 responses per second. Each suc-
cessive shift to a higher FR value shifted re-
sponding to a higher rate. Responding was
not, however, quite as stable as it was during
the CRF schedule. Periods of more rapid and
less rapid responding alternated within a nar-
row range (perhaps 2 to 3 responses per sec-
ond). No interreinforcer pattern of pausing
and responding emerged. There was no ten-
dency toward break-and-run, for example,
during the 91 reinforcers obtained under FR
32.
The Daly–Daly Model
The DMOD* model achieved stable re-
sponding after less than a simulated 7 min
(1,200 iteration cycles). Each of the subse-
quent ratios was presented for that same
amount of time (see Figure 9a).
Performance under FR 1 was identical to
the previous CRF performance: steady re-
sponding just above 1 response per second.
Performance under the sequence of FR
schedules was as follows: Responding was
somewhat slowed during FR 2 and became
more variable in rate. There was, however, no
long-term decline during this 1,200-cycle pe-
riod. FR 4 through FR 16 continued to main-
tain pecking at this somewhat slower (0.4 re-
sponses per second) overall rate. As with the
RE model, no apparent pattern of respond-
ing developed between reinforcers (i.e., no
break-and-run pattern). Continued training
at FR 32 (55 reinforcers) showed responding
at the same overall rate, with occasional hints
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Fig. 8. Cumulative record of the RE model under CRF followed by FR 2, FR 4, FR 8, FR 16, and FR 32. Vertical
dotted lines indicate ratio changes. Pips indicate reinforcer delivery. The response pen reset to 0 after each 1,500
responses. See Figure 3 for an explanation of the scales and legend.
of a pause developing early in some inter-
reinforcer intervals.
Figure 9b shows a replication of DMOD*
under control of 1,200 iteration cycles of
CRF, followed by a simulated 2 hr 40 min
(over 28,000 cycles) of FR 32. The direct shift
from CRF to FR 32 produced a pattern of
responding similar to that generated by the
progressive approach to FR 32. Overall rate
was 0.4 responses per second, and the inter-
reinforcer pattern varied from one reinforcer
to the next. This more extended training on
FR 32, however (approximately 132 reinforc-
ers), did not produce a clear development of
the characteristic FR break-and-run pattern
of responding (Ferster & Skinner, 1957) be-
tween reinforcers.
DISCUSSION
In Situ simulations of ratio schedules chal-
lenged computational learning theories in
ways that more conventional simulations can-
not. Trial-by-trial simulations, for instance,
present all relevant stimulus information to
the model on each iteration. Partial observ-
ability allows the In Situ testbed to evaluate
learning models with respect to important
features of real animal behavior. To the de-
gree that a pigeon or a learning model re-
sponds differently to a lit key shortly after re-
inforcement than it does to the same lit key
after several key pecks, that pigeon is under
control of the situation rather than merely
the momentary stimulus.
The failure of either model to develop a
postreinforcement pause indicates a failure
of those models to address Skinner’s ques-
tion: ‘‘What are the relevant features of the
environment, and how are they to be mea-
sured and controlled?’’ (1984a, p. 514, 1988a,
p. 83). Traditionally, learning theories are ex-
pressed in terms of generic stimuli and re-
sponses, neglecting distinctions such as that
between the momentary stimulus and the to-
tal ongoing situation. By explicitly modeling
these distinctions, the In Situ testbed forces
theories to demonstrate the ability to come
under the control of temporally extended
phenomena despite having been exposed to
the stimuli on a moment-to-moment basis
only. Thus, the failures of these models dem-
onstrate important capabilities of the In Situ
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Fig. 9. Cumulative records of the DMOD* model under FR schedules. The top panel (a) shows the DMOD*
model under CRF followed by FR 2, FR 4, FR 8, FR 16, and FR 32. The bottom panel (b) shows the DMOD* model
under CRF followed immediately by FR 32. Vertical dotted lines indicate ratio changes. Pips indicate reinforcer
delivery. Note the difference in scales between top and bottom panels. See Figure 3 for an explanation of the scales
and legend.
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Computational models of reinforcement
schedules face a special problem in that ratio
and interval schedules treat time differently:
It can be an independent variable in interval
schedules but not in ratio schedules. Com-
putational systems use states to model inde-
pendent variables. Markovian and non-Mar-
kovian models, which support different types
of mathematical analysis, place different re-
strictions on the relations between states and
time. For a Markovian model, such as those
used here, the value of every independent
variable must be available as a feature of the
current state; history does not matter. Mar-
kovian models of interval schedules, in which
time is an independent variable, are thus
problematic.
Models of learning are inherently non-Mar-
kovian, in that history matters a great deal.
Metaphors such as ‘‘memory’’ are invoked to
suggest that the brain somehow translates his-
tory into the current ‘‘state’’ of the brain.
The problem of modeling environments,
such as is done with the In Situ testbed, is
nowhere near so complex. The operant
chamber itself is a Markovian device, using
timers to encode the intervals elapsed since
various past events as current states of the
timing mechanism. The ‘‘state’’ of the real
operant chamber includes the then-current
timer setting. Being restricted to modeling
only external environmental and body events,
the In Situ testbed can resolve the problem
of modeling interval schedules in exactly the
same fashion as is done by the operant cham-
ber. The setting of a simulated timer is in-
cluded as a feature of the state definition, as
shown in Figure 10.
METHOD
Models and Apparatus
Both the RE and DMOD* models were re-
tained for the FI simulation.
The apparatus was identical to that used in
the CRF and FR simulations.
Procedure
The procedure for In Situ simulation of FI
schedules is illustrated in Figure 10, which is
an expanded version of the standard Mech-
ner diagram (cf. Figure 1c). Standard Mech-
ner diagrams use distinct symbols (e.g., the T
in Figure 1c) for state transitions initiated by
timers in the operant chamber as opposed to
responses by the organism (Mechner, 1959).
In our expanded version, any transition
events not initiated by the behavior of the or-
ganism are designated with an H subscripted
by a function giving the definition of the
event. The timer setting is included among
the situational variables. Within the simula-
tion, each iteration within an interval consti-
tutes a new state. Thus, each bracket sum-
marizes the many states with timer values
satisfying the inequality listed within the pa-
rentheses. FI schedules, like FR schedules,
are partially observable, in that the timer set-
ting, like the ratio counter, is not observable
by the pigeon. For simplicity, we continue to
represent the closing of the feeder with an R
rather than with an H subscripted to indicate
the 3⅔-s feeder interval.
The strategy for testing the models under
FI was to retain the best parameters found for
each model under CRF/EXT and to subject
each model first to CRF until stable respond-
ing (as determined by visual inspection) was
established, followed by an FI 1-min schedule.
RESULTS
The Roth–Erev Model
Figure 11 shows the RE model under con-
trol of a simulated 11 min (2,000 iteration
cycles) of CRF (FR 1), followed by a simulat-
ed 16 min (almost 3,000 cycles) of FI 1 min.
Performance under FR 1 was the same as that
shown previously: steady responding at about
1 response per second, stable after 2,000 it-
eration cycles.
Under the FI 1-min schedule, responding
increased with the change from CRF to FI (as
it had for extinction). Responding was main-
tained at a fairly steady pace of about 2 re-
sponses per second throughout the 13 rein-
forcers provided according to this schedule.
Although there were minor moment-to-mo-
ment variations in rate of responding, there
was no development of a pattern of respond-
ing paced by the interreinforcer intervals.
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Fig. 10. Expanded Mechner diagram for the FI 3-min schedule. Each bracket designates a state as distinguished
by four features: head position, keylight and feeder status, and a range of values for the interval timer. In addition
to the deeds used in Figure 7, state transitions can also occur as the result of events (called haps) occurring in the
feeder mechanism. These are usually timed events and are designated by the letter H (equivalent to a T in a standard
Mechner diagram). The condition triggering the event is indicated in the subscript t(3). The additional feeder status
(designated with an a) indicates that the feeder will open on the next key peck. See Figure 7 for an explanation of
the other abbreviations and symbols.
Neither extinction-like nor scalloped patterns
appeared.
The Daly–Daly Model
Figure 12 shows responding generated by
the DMOD* model under control of less than
simulated 7 min (1,200 iteration cycles) of
CRF, followed by a simulated 1 hr 40 min
(over 18,000 cycles) of FI 1 min. Performance
under CRF was identical to that previously
shown: steady responding just above 1 re-
sponse per second that stabilized after 1,200
iteration cycles.
Under the FI 1-min schedule, as with ex-
tinction, responding declined across the first
interreinforcer interval. Responding then
recovered and was maintained at an overall
rate of 0.4 responses per second for the du-
ration of training (approximately a simulat-
ed 105 min). There was no clear develop-
ment of a response pattern filling the
interreinforcer intervals. Some intervals pro-
vided sharp run-and-break patterns (remi-
niscent of the mini-extinction curves some-
times seen early in the development of FI
patterning). A few intervals appeared to start
with a lower rate and end with a higher rate
(scallop pattern), but this pattern did not in-
crease across training.
When this training was extended for a pe-
riod simulating almost 2 hr 40 min (over
28,000 cycles) of FI 1 min, again, scallop pat-
terns were not observed to become more fre-
quent with training (not shown).
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Fig. 11. Cumulative record of the RE model under CRF followed by FI 1 min. Vertical dotted lines indicate the
introduction of the FI schedule. Pips indicate reinforcer delivery. The response pen reset to 0 after each 1,500
responses. See Figure 3 for an explanation of the scales and legend.
Fig. 12. Cumulative record of the DMOD* model under CRF followed by FI 1 min. Vertical dotted lines indicate
the introduction of the FI schedule. Pips indicate reinforcer delivery. The response pen reset to 0 after each 1,000
responses. See Figure 3 for an explanation of the scales and legend.
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DISCUSSION
Simulations of FI schedules with the In Situ
testbed demonstrated the inability of both
the RE and DMOD* models to simulate pi-
geon responding under those schedules as
well as the capability of the In Situ testbed to
accurately generate both interval and ratio
schedule performances.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We have presented example results from a
novel testing procedure. Three questions are
considered here: How well did the procedure
work? Of what value is the procedure to con-
temporary behavior analysis? What concep-
tual issues arise in considering adoption of
the procedure?
Before we consider these questions, how-
ever, it should be noted that our goals for the
present report are aspirational. We wish to
demonstrate the potential of In Situ rather
than to reject models here. It is hardly a mark
against the Staddon–Zhang model that it was
unable to generate organized temporal se-
quences of responses. The Staddon–Zhang
model was designed to emphasize a particular
point, not to simulate the changes in behav-
ior of a whole pigeon. It would be unreason-
able, therefore, for us to claim that the pres-
ent study has falsified any of the three models
tested. Examined on their own terms, all
three models performed well in the prior
publications designed to show their strengths.
Examined on the novel terms proposed by
Church (1997) and by ourselves, however, all
three performed poorly. With this report, we
are advocating that modelers take up the
challenge of creating new behavioral models
that are powerful enough to handle simula-
tions like the In Situ simulations presented
herein.
TESTBED ASSESSMENT
Evaluating any testing procedure involves
determining reliability and validity (Anastasi,
1988; Carmines & Zeller, 1979).
Reliability
A testing procedure is reliable to the de-
gree that the results limit the amount of ran-
dom (unbiased) error or ‘‘noise’’ (Carmines
& Zeller, 1979, pp. 13–15). The underlying
strategy for any reliability assessment is to re-
peat measures under conditions in which
only uncontrolled factors can alter the result.
The degree to which the results vary across
these measurements determines the assessed
reliability.
Test-retest. In the usual psychological testing,
test-retest procedures form the core of reli-
ability assessment. Examinees and procedures
are held constant; only occasions are allowed
to vary (Shavelson, Webb, & Rowley, 1989).
In the present context, in which one com-
puter program is being used to test another,
simply running the same computer routines
(with the same random seed) on a second
occasion will generate identical results.
Therefore, the notion of merely repeating a
measurement is not applicable.
Instead, to determine reliability, parame-
ters of the testbed that model factors that are
usually uncontrolled in real operant condi-
tioning experiments can be systematically var-
ied across simulations. For example, two fac-
tors over which real operant procedures are
generally reliable are the choice of individual
subject (In Situ represents an individual by
selecting a unique pseudorandom seed for
the random number generator) and small
variations in the duration of individual com-
ponents or events in a sequence of schedules
(the precise number of iteration cycles that a
particular MDP is in effect during the simu-
lation). As noted in Simulation 1, only in the
case of DMOD* did this type of variation pro-
duce any effect. The failure of these manip-
ulations for our implementation of the
DMOD model challenges either the stability
of DMOD* or the reliability of the In Situ
testbed. The fact that only this one model ex-
hibited these difficulties suggests that either
DMOD* has some instability or the In Situ
testbed is an unreliable procedure for evalu-
ating DMOD*, despite being a reliable pro-
cedure for the other two models. In our dis-
cussion of construct validity below, we will
argue for the former.
Internal consistency. A procedure is said to
be internally consistent if task difficulty and
examinee attributes are systematically related.
For this reason, tests of internal consistency
are often considered to be measures of valid-
ity as well as reliability. An important advan-
tage to the use of Mechner’s (1959) classifi-
cation system for reinforcement schedules is
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that it provides an external measure of com-
plexity and, hence, of task difficulty for dif-
ferent reinforcement schedules. The greater
the number of situations and deeds, the fewer
paths through the expanded Mechner dia-
gram result in reinforcement. From this per-
spective, CRF is objectively ‘‘simpler’’ than FR
or FI, and higher ratios and longer intervals
are more ‘‘difficult’’ than lower and shorter
ones, respectively.
One piece of evidence that the In Situ test-
bed exhibits internal consistency is that none
of the three models failed to simulate animal
behavior for a simpler schedule and then suc-
ceeded with a more complex one. Only the
one model that adequately simulated behav-
ior under both CRF and EXT, DMOD*, man-
aged even a rough simulation of the various
ratio and interval schedules.
Informativeness. Although not strictly a com-
ponent of either reliability or validity alone,
an important feature of any test is that it be
informative. A test so easy that everyone gets
an A and a test so difficult that everyone gets
an F are both equally uninformative for pur-
poses of comparing students. Because a prin-
cipal purpose of the In Situ testbed is model
comparison, informativeness is vital. Of the
three models tested, one failed the first and
simplest simulation, one managed acquisition
under CRF but failed to show realistic extinc-
tion, and the last passed Simulation 1, but
failed to show a break-and-run pattern under
FR or an FI scallop in Simulations 2 and 3.
Therefore, the In Situ testbed was informa-
tive in distinguishing among the three mod-
els. As improved theories become available,
the entire array of reinforcement schedules
used in over 40 years of published data are
available to provide simulations of varying dif-
ficulty, maintaining informativeness without
risking internal consistency.
Validity
A testing procedure is valid to the degree
that the results limit the amount of nonran-
dom (biased) error (Carmines & Zeller, 1979,
pp. 13–15). To the degree that a test mea-
sures what it is designed to measure, it is val-
id. The central challenge in assessing validity
is in determining the ‘‘true’’ value of what is
being measured independently of the test
used to perform that measurement.
Content validity. A test item exhibits content
validity if it identifies some aspect of the en-
vironment that controls the behavioral com-
petence to be tested (Anastasi, 1988). For the
In Situ testbed, examination of its logic by
researchers who are familiar with the me-
chanical details of the operant chamber is the
best test of content validity. Because the logic
of the testbed is presented in the form of ex-
panded Mechner diagrams, the evidence of
content validity is made explicit and public in
a form that does not require the reader to be
an expert in computers or computer pro-
gramming. To the degree that researchers
are convinced that each of these expanded
Mechner diagrams accurately identifies the
contingencies instantiated by the correspond-
ing reinforcement schedule, the In Situ test-
bed can claim content validity. Thus, we leave
the assessment of content validity to the read-
er.
Criterion validity. A procedure is said to ex-
hibit criterion validity if some independent
evaluation of the examinees corresponds with
the evaluation made by the procedure being
assessed. We have two independent measures
of the three models examined. The relative
number and complexity of phenomena suc-
cessfully addressed in the published reports
of the three models provide a rough measure
of their relative efficacy. The relative number
of internal components (equations and pa-
rameters) in the three models provides a
rough measure of their potential explanatory
power. In each case the order is the same.
The DMOD model is more complex than,
and has been demonstrated to account for
more phenomena than, the Roth–Erev mod-
el, which is more complex than, and has been
demonstrated to account for more phenom-
ena than, the Staddon–Zhang model. The re-
sults of In Situ testing produce the same or-
der, demonstrating a degree of criterion
validity.
Construct validity. In the context of testing
humans, the notion of construct validity is dif-
ficult for behaviorists to accept, because con-
struct validity is often described in terms of
traits—traits supposedly possessed by the ex-
aminee. In the present context, however, in
which the examinee is a set of equations, no
such problem arises. What might be called
our examinees’ complete anatomy and phys-
iology are available for inspection, and no
surplus meaning is implied. To the degree
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that the In Situ test results, expressed in
terms of the phenomena of operant learn-
ing—such as success (or failure) in acquisi-
tion or extinction, evidence (or lack thereof)
of an FI scallop or ratio strain, and so on—
can be related to mathematical features of
the model being tested (the model’s internal
traits, so to speak), the testbed exhibits con-
struct validity.
It is possible that the In Situ testbed might
have been reliable and valid in every other
respect and still have lacked construct validi-
ty. The testbed might deliver accurate, reli-
able results determining which models suc-
ceeded or failed in simulating various
operant phenomena under control of various
reinforcement schedules, but it is only if
these results guide the theoretician to specific
weaknesses or lacunae of the theory that the
testbed exhibits construct validity.
The results of the three simulations show
that the In Situ testbed has construct validity.
For example, following the simulations, we
are in a position to recommend adjustments
in the theories that would correct weaknesses
exhibited in those simulations. The test of the
SZ model pointed to the lack of a third pa-
rameter for setting the operant level indepen-
dent of the conditionability, thus confirming
the original authors’ position on this point
(Staddon & Zhang, 1991, p. 289). The test of
the RE model illustrated the precise weak-
nesses that led the original authors to ad-
vance a second, more complex model (Erev
& Roth, 1998; Roth & Erev, 1995). This sec-
ond model has three additional parameters,
including a ‘‘forgetting’’ parameter to ac-
count for extinction. The test of DMOD*
confirmed the original authors’ admission
that their model lacked a specific approach
to ‘‘performance mapping’’ (Daly & Daly,
1982, p. 447). Further, the test of DMOD*
also identified a second, hitherto unidenti-
fied problem: There is no means of identify-
ing which responses are to be used in deter-
mining the magnitude of ‘‘secondary’’
reinforcement. Finally, the In Situ test of
DMOD* detected hypersensitivity of the re-
sults to both the pseudorandom seed (data
not shown) and the precise duration of CRF
preceding EXT. This hypersensitivity strongly
suggests that nonlinearities in the model gen-
erate chaotic (or at least catastrophic) fluc-
tuations. In each and every case, the results
from the In Situ testbed were highly diagnos-
tic. Presumably, after these tests, the theore-
ticians are in a better position to improve
their theories.
That we hold back from suggesting specific
solutions to the problems identified indicates
an ineluctable awkwardness in testing some-
one else’s theory. When the tests revealed an
inadequacy in a model, we felt obligated to
restrict the extent to which we modified the
model to help it pass the test. But, the ques-
tion remains, were we assiduous enough?
Were we persistent enough? Were we creative
enough? Did we give each model every op-
portunity to pass these difficult tests? Did we
represent the theories well enough? Our pur-
pose in the present article is to demonstrate,
insofar as possible, situational tests of each
theory as published. We hope the authors of
the theories will use the diagnoses provided
by these simulations to generate improve-
ments in their theories. We hope that theo-
reticians in general will make use of the In
Situ testbed to evaluate and improve their
emerging theories of learning.
Our ultimate goal is to stimulate the gen-
eration of new and better theories by helping
theoreticians test their own models using the
In Situ testbed. We do not wish to test theo-
ries ourselves, but we can provide a set of
standardized statistical routines for such test-
ing.
THE ROLE OF DIRECT ANALYSIS
We propose that these situational analyses
are a form of direct analysis. Typically, the op-
erant literature provides a functional analysis,
showing the functional relation between var-
iables (e.g., Shull, 1991). Relations are dem-
onstrated between conditions of the experi-
ment and data from an experimental analyses
of behavior, carried out at either a molar or
a molecular level.4 Direct analysis is not a
form of and cannot replace functional anal-
ysis. Direct analysis does not produce either
an experimental analysis of behavior or a
functional analysis. Instead, direct analysis
can be used in concert with a functional anal-
ysis to further the analysis of behavior.
4 This distinction (Baum, 1973; Meazzini & Ricci,
1986) is often made to contrast accounts describing over-
all functional relations (molar) versus moment-to-mo-
ment (molecular) changes in behavior. The present
method is intended to be useful to both approaches.
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Defining Direct Analysis
Direct analysis uses mechanical procedures
to generate behavioral predictions from hy-
potheses given in the form of models or the-
ories. The key to direct analysis is that the
level of granularity of the mechanically gen-
erated predictions is set finely enough to
match the level of measurement for the ac-
tual behavior emitted by the organism in the
laboratory (Kemp & Eckerman, 1995). One
test of this match is that the structure of the
data file produced by a direct analysis should
be identical to the structure of the data file
obtained from an experiment (Church,
1997). (The only difference is that the direct
analysis may produce a record of events that
cannot be recorded in an experiment for
practical reasons.) Thus, predictions gener-
ated by a procedure for a direct analysis can
be compared directly to the results obtained
from an experimental analysis of behavior, re-
gardless of how fine a level of detail is speci-
fied for the experimental analysis.
The present study illustrates direct analysis
by generating predictions from computation-
al models of learning at a level of granularity
fine enough that the predictions are dis-
played as cumulative records. Ordinarily, neu-
ral networks and other computational models
of learning do not (and we argue cannot)
generate predictions at that level of granular-
ity. Therefore, they must be analyzed indirect-
ly, whether the comparison is with predictions
made at either a molar or a molecular level.
For example, neural networks are usually
evaluated by comparison with other theories,
and are not compared directly to data. Simi-
larly, machine-learning models are usually ex-
pressed at the abstract level of symbolic arti-
ficial intelligence, in terms of problems and
solutions rather than in terms of behavior. We
advocate the use of direct analysis to augment
extant indirect analyses.
Integrating Direct and Functional
Analyses: An Example
To illustrate how direct analysis can be in-
tegrated with and can augment a functional
analysis, we will consider Shull’s (1979) func-
tional analyses of the postreinforcement
pause. Shull proposed that the postreinforce-
ment pause consists of two components: (a)
a true pause consisting of nonterminal be-
havior primarily controlled by reinforcers
that are implicit in the situation and are not
provided by the experimenter and (b) un-
measured terminal behavior that is precur-
rent to the first postreinforcement response
and is putatively also controlled by the exper-
imenter-provided reinforcers. Shull offered a
number of arguments, supported by func-
tional analyses, in support of this thesis.
Suppose a computational theory (or theo-
ries) were offered to account for FI pattern-
ing as described by Shull’s (1979) data. Sup-
pose further that the theory were tested in
the In Situ testbed and showed good acqui-
sition and extinction of the operant, as well
as reasonable overall rates of responding un-
der both FI and FR reinforcement schedules.
Suppose, however, that the theory failed to
show a postreinforcement pause. (Such mod-
els are not out of the question. Erev & Roth’s,
1998, extension of the RE model shows better
extinction performance than did RE and is
therefore a candidate. Ideally, the instability
found in DMOD* can be rectified.) This di-
rect analysis would then be able to provide a
basis for further testing of computational
models representing Shull’s hypothesis using
the In Situ testbed.
The feature of the In Situ testbed that en-
ables it to augment and support a functional
analysis such as Shull’s is its flexibility in sim-
ulating postulated contingencies and deeds at
whatever level of detail the functional analysis
demands. Shull (1979, pp. 214–215; Cape-
hart, Eckerman, Guilkey, & Shull, 1980), for
example, offered a functional analysis of how
the amount of terminal behavior affects the
terminations-per-opportunity function. Such
behavior could be modeled with the In Situ
testbed in a straightforward manner: Treat
the sequence of deeds, beginning with ter-
mination of the nonterminal behavior (e.g.,
returning the head to face the panel) and
ending with the head positioned in front of
the lit key, as a sequence of stages (in fact,
proposed by Shull). In short, the model be-
ing tested, under control of the chosen
schedule, would generate differing amounts
of nonterminal and terminal behavior. Fea-
tures of the testbed can be varied so as to
model the effects of the specific variables pos-
tulated in Shull’s analyses. Further, these fea-
tures could be varied identically for all mod-
els under test so as to aid comparisons.
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A central feature of Shull’s functional anal-
ysis is that less control over the time spent in
unmeasured terminal behavior is exercised
by FI than by FR schedules. This hypothesis
can be tested for various models using direct
analysis with the In Situ testbed. Further, the
contribution of the various components sug-
gested by Shull (e.g., number of stages, du-
ration of each stage, number of types of non-
terminal behavior, amount of nonterminal
reinforcement available, etc.) can be system-
atically assessed.
In fact, direct analysis allows a researcher
to test hypotheses, at any point on the molar
to molecular continuum, by simulating those
sources and examining the resultant effects
in a form of data directly comparable to that
used to report the original effects in the em-
pirical literature. Direct analysis provides a
bridge between functional analyses and the
experimental analyses of behavior.
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
Further discussions of the issues raised
above are not appropriate for a method-fo-
cused report such as this. Yet, we would be
remiss if we avoided indicating relevant issues
for future discussions as well as resources
available for the reader to investigate. For in-
stance, issues surrounding the incommensu-
rability of bodily movements and accomplish-
ments that lead to the neural network
dilemma are discussed in Weiss (1924, pp.
42–44, 1925, pp. 55–56), Guthrie (1940),
Wittgenstein (1953, §612), Austin (1962, p.
112), Goldman (1970), Lee (1981, 1983,
1986, 1988, 1996), and Kemp (1996). Tech-
niques for evaluating the microstructure of
behavior are addressed by Mechner (1992),
Lee (1996), and Kemp and Eckerman
(1995). Mechner diagrams are presented in
Mechner (1959), Weingarten and Mechner
(1966), and Millenson (1967). Markov deci-
sion processes and partially observable Mar-
kov decision processes, the mathematical for-
malisms underlying the expanded Mechner
diagrams, are presented in Kaelbling et al.
(1998), Howard (1960), Sondik (1971), and
Monahan (1982). In addition, relations be-
tween these formal devices and computation-
al models of behavior (called reinforcement
learning) are discussed by Barto, Bradtke,
and Singh (1995), Singh et al. (1994), Jaakola
et al. (1995), and Sutton and Barto (1998).
Issues surrounding the computational
modeling of behavior as environment–behav-
ior interactions, discussed under the rubric of
situativity theory, are presented in Clancey
(1993, 1997), D. A. Norman (1993), Vera and
Simon (1993a, 1993b), and Suchman (1993).
Situational semantics, the formal underpin-
nings to situativity theory, are discussed by
Barwise and Perry (1983) and Burke (1991),
among others. The variant of information
theory necessary to situational semantics and
the present analysis was authored by Dretske
(1981), and the implications are discussed by
Kemp and Eckerman (1995). General non-
technical introductions to the issues sur-
rounding the computational simulation of in-
teracting systems are given in Casti (1997)
and Gleick (1987).
Issues in the evaluation of computational
models of behavior have been largely neglect-
ed. Exceptions are Abelson (1968), Newell
and Simon (1972), Einhorn, Kleinmuntz,
and Kleinmuntz (1979), Staddon (1988),
Massaro (1988), Kemp and Eckerman
(1995), and Church (1997). Many issues in-
volving the integration of these topics with
the study of learning remain, as does the is-
sue of their potential impact on behavior
analysis.
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APPENDIX A
Equations for the SZ Model
Stated formally, for situation i at time t:
for all deedsR(t) 5 R , where V (t) $ V (t)ik ik ij
j (winner take all):
with no reinforcement,
V (t) 5 a V (t 2 1) 1 e(1 2 a );ij ij ij ij
with reinforcement,
V (t) 5 a V (t 2 1) 1 e(1 2 a )ij ij ij ij
1 b V (t 2 1),ij ij
0 , a , 1; a 1 b , 1;ij ij ij
where is a matrix of values for eachV 5 {v }ij
response in the response matrix, R 5 {r }.ij
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is the matrix of adaptation parame-A 5 {a }ij
ters determining the duration of the effect of
reinforcement. is the matrix ofB 5 {b }ij
arousal parameters determining the magni-
tude of the effect of reinforcement. e is a ran-
dom variable distributed uniformly over the
[0, 1] interval. is the response made atR(t)
time t (Staddon & Zhang, 1991).
APPENDIX B
Equations for the RE Model
Stated formally, for situation i at time t:
(t)vij(t)p 5 for every deed, jij (t)vO ij
j
(t)(t)a 5 a with probability, pij ij
(t) (t21)W 5 d ·W (exponential decay)
(t)w 5 1ij
(t) (t21) (t)V 5 V 1 c ·c ·Wij
(t)(t11)s 5 d (s ),ij
where is a matrix of values for eachV 5 {v }ij
action in the action matrix, A 5 {a }. W 5ij
is the matrix of weights indicating the{w }ij
susceptibility of each action to subsequent
reinforcement. d is the decay rate, and c is
the reinforcer potency. is 1.0 for a rein-c ij
forcing action (e.g., feeding) and 0.0 for any
other action. is the action taken at time(t)a
t and is the weight corresponding to that(t)wij
action.
APPENDIX C
Equations for the DMOD* Model
Notational conventions: Matrices are in up-
percase italic, There are n rows, oneG 5 {g }.ij
for each stimulus cue, and m columns, one
for each deed. Vectors are lowercase bold-
face. The vector is the column vector forg •j
the jth column of is transpose func-G. T( )
tion. C is the Hadamard product operator.
(Each element of the Hadamard product of
two conformal matrices or arrays consists of
the product of the corresponding elements
of the factors.)
The Greek letters a, b, g, and l are re-
served for parameters of the model and as
such are constant across time. When indexed
by the iteration cycle, t, it indicates that the
choice of parameter varies over cycles as spec-
ified in the equations. All other variables are
presumed to be indexed by the iteration cy-
cle, t, unless marked with an asterisk, indicat-
ing the next cycle, (t 1 1). For example, s is
the column vector of stimulus cues present
on cycle t, and s* is the column vector of stim-
ulus cues present on cycle t 1 1.
Parameters: g is the spatial gradient param-
eter, ranging from 0 to 1, and is assumed con-
stant for these simulations. are the salienc-ai
es, one for each stimulus cue. The vector a
is a column vector of the saliences. The b pa-
rameters are the learning and decay param-
eters for the various components for both pri-
mary and secondary reinforcement. There
are 12 b parameters:
learning rates for primary1 1 1b b bX,1 Y,1 Z,1
reinforcement
decay rates for primary2 2 2b b bX,1 Y,1 Z,1
reinforcement
learning rates for secondary1 1 1b b bX,2 Y,2 Z,2
reinforcement
decay rates for secondary2 2 2b b bX,2 Y,2 Z,2
reinforcement
although, for most simulations, all learning
rates are equal and all decay rates are equal.
l is the value for primary reinforcement, set
to 1 in these simulations. l(t) 5 l when re-
inforcement occurs and 0 otherwise.
The action, , on each cycle is deter-a(t)
mined based upon the matrix of values, V 5
on cycle t. At every point, V is composed{v }ij
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of three additive components: approach, X,
avoidance, Y, and counterconditioning, Z.
These components are altered by both pri-
mary and secondary reinforcement on each
cycle.
For situation k at time t:
V 5 X 1 gY 1 Z,
q 5 T(s)V, where 5 1 if cue i is presentsi
and 0 otherwise.
u 5 (zqz 1 q)/2




p 5 .j uO j
j
Primary reinforcement, given deed j 5 a ,ij
for situation i at time t:
V 5 (X 1 DX) 1 g(Y 1 DY) 1 (Z 1 DZ),
where D are 0 for all columns ±jX, DY, DZ
and
(t)Dx 5 (sCa)b (d )•j XX,1
where
d 5 l(t) 2 T(s)x andX •j
1b if d $ 0XX,1(t)b 5X,1 25b otherwise.X,1
(t)(sCa)b (d ) if d , 0Y XY,1Dy 5•j (t)5(sCa)b (0 2 T(s)y ) otherwise,•jY,1
where
d 5 2d 2 T(s)y andY X •j
1b if d , d , 0X YY,1(t)b 5Y,1 25b otherwise.Y,1
(t)(sCa)b (d ) if d $ 0Z XZ,1Dz 5•j (t)5(sCa)b (0 2 T(s)z ) otherwise,•jZ,1
where
d 5 0 2 T(s)y 2 T(s)z andZ •j •j
1b if d $ 0 and d . 0X YZ,1(t)b 5Z,1 25b otherwise.Z,1
Secondary reinforcement:
e 5 T(s*)V
where 5 1 if cue i is present at time (t 1*si
1) and 0 otherwise.
c 5 (zez 1 e)/2





Given deed for situation i at time t:j 5 a ,ij
V 5 (X 1 DX) 1 g(Y 1 DY) 1 (Z 1 DZ),
where D are 0 for all columns ±jX, DY, DZ
and
(t)Dx 5 (sCa)b (wT(X)s* 2 T(s)x )•j •jX,2
where
1b if wT(X)s* $ T(s)x •jX,2(t)b 5X,2 25b otherwise.X,2
(t)Dy 5 (sCa)b [wT(Y)s* 2 T(s)y ]•j •jY,2
where
1b if wT(Y)s* # T(s)y•jY,2(t)b 5Y,2 25b otherwise.Y,2
(t)Dz 5 (sCa)b [wT(Z)s* 2 T(s)z ]•j •jZ,2
where
1b if wT(Z)s* $ T(s)z •jZ,2(t)b 5Z,2 25b otherwise.Z,2
